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I. INTRODUCTION
In a trilogy of decisions handed down in June 2010, the Supreme
Court narrowed the application of the honest-services doctrine, codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1346, to bribery and kickbacks-resulting in one of the most
anticipated developments in white-collar criminal law.1 Although several
Justices would have voided the statute as unconstitutionally vague,2 the
majority salvaged § 1346 by narrowing its application.
The Court's trilogy has impacted one of the most powerful tools
possessed by prosecutors-a twenty-eight-word provision' in the federal
mail- and wire-fraud statutess that has led to the conviction of many white-
* Attorney, Washington, D.C. J.D., Notre Dame Law School; M.A., Jagiellonian
University; B.A., University of Chicago. This Article was written in the author's individual
capacity and all opinions are the author's alone.
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010); Black v. United States, 130
S. Ct. 2963 (2010); Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (mem.) (per curiam).
2 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring).
3 Id. at 2931 (majority opinion).
4 The honest-services provision provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, the
term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services." 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006 & Supp. Ill 2009).
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collar defendants, ranging from Illinois Governor George H. Ryan, Sr.6 to
Enron's Jeffrey Skilling.7 Given the breadth of the resulting indictments, it is
not entirely surprising that the majority of the Court viewed an unrestricted §
1346 as unconstitutionally vague, while Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas viewed § 1346 as unsalvageable.
Prior to this series of cases, federal prosecutors used the honest-
services statute to target schemes to defraud people of their right to fair,
honest, and impartial services.' The honest-services statute, which
encompasses defendants in both the private and public sectors, including
those in state and federal governments, often served as a favorable
prosecutorial alternative to the narrower federal bribery and gratuities law,
which applies only to federal public officials.9
For decades, however, many commentators have clamored against
the statute, which, according to them, served as a catchall for all fraudulent
schemes, even when the defendant's direct financial benefit could not readily
be proven."o In fact, the split between the Justices in the majority and those
concurring in the trilogy was representative of the greater debate on the
topic," which has spanned many commentators 2 and circuit courts, 3 as well
6 See generally United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming
the district court judgment convicting Governor George H. Ryan, Sr. of, inter alia, mail fraud
under the honest-services provision of § 1346).
7 See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907.
8 Generally, the federal mail- and wire-fraud statutes prohibit the use of the mail
or interstate wire or radio transmissions in furtherance of a "scheme or artifice to defraud," §§
1341, 1343, which includes a "scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services." § 1346; see also infra notes 22-23. The legal analyses for both wire and mail
fraud are nearly the same. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 199 F.3d 184, 188 (5th Cir. 1999)
(noting that the mail- and wire-fraud statutes have common language in relevant part).
9 Randall D. Eliason, Surgery With a Meat Axe: Using Honest Services Fraud to
Prosecute Federal Corruption, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 929, 932 (2009) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 201).
10 E.g., Calfee, Halter & Griswold LLP, US. Supreme Court Limits "Honest
Services" Prosecutions, CALFEE (July 29, 2010), http://www.calfee.com/ArticleView.aspx?
ArticlelD=889.
I1 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining that § 1346 is
unconstitutionally vague). Cynthia Hujar Orr, President of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, noted the division of opinion on the meaning of honest services:
"We are nonetheless disappointed that the Court has held that there remains a place in our
criminal justice system for a statute on whose meaning few can agree." Press Release, Nat'l
Ass'n Criminal Def. Lawyers, Supreme Court Rejects Expansive Interpretation of 'Honest
Services' Fraud Statute (June 24, 2010), http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/NewsReleases/
201 Omn2O?OpenDocument.
12 See, e.g., Marc Martin, The Dilemma of the Honest Services Statute: Honest
Services and Common Sense, 24 CBA REc., Jan. 2010, at 34.
13 See Joseph E. Huigens, Note, IfAll Politicians are Corrupt, But All Defendants
are Presumed Innocent, Then What? A Case for Change in Honest Services Fraud
Prosecutions, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1687, 1714-18 (2010) (discussing the circuit split on
the constitutionality of § 1346); James T. Van Strander, Comment, A Potent Federal
Prosecutorial Tool: Weyhrauch v. United States, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR
80, 80-81 (2009), http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/djclpp/index.php?action=showitem
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as both the United States Supreme Court and Congress. 14 The Supreme
Court's most recent concerns with the honest-services doctrine were
foreshadowed by Justice Scalia's dissent from a 2009 denial of certiorari,
wherein he noted the constitutional problems with the doctrine.
Even following the Court's recent trilogy of decisions on honest
services, the doctrine remains unsettled because Congress might endeavor to
circumvent the Court's ruling, as it has done previously on this very topic. 16
Alternatively, Congress may legislate a different interpretation of the honest-
services doctrine, albeit within the boundaries of the Court's rulings. 7 As the
doctrine continues its development in the legislatures and courts, it is
important to understand the implications of the Supreme Court's trilogy of
cases.
Part II of this Article therefore begins by reviewing the honest-
services doctrine and the Supreme Court rulings narrowing it, considering
the future of honest-services cases and their context in white-collar crime.
Part III then analyzes the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the checks and
balances implicated, concluding with considerations for any future
legislation on honest services.
II. THE HONEST-SERVICES LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The honest-services doctrine has a tumultuous history.' 8 Both
Congress and the federal courts have attempted to define its contours, which
has resulted in several incarnations of the doctrine. The most recent
milestone in the doctrine's development was the Supreme Court's trilogy of
cases, but the doctrine has a long history that illuminates its meaning.
A. The Background on the Honest-Services Doctrine
The honest-services doctrine is an outgrowth of the mail-fraud
statutes. The original mail-fraud provision was enacted in 1872 and
"proscribed . . . use of the mails to advance any scheme or artifice to
&id=155 (noting the circuit split on the interpretation of § 1346).
14 See infra Part III.B. 1.
is Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1311 (2009) (mem.) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 33-39 (In McNally v. United States, the
Court excluded the defrauding of citizens of their right to "good government" from the reach
of § 1341; Congress reversed McNally through its enactment of § 1346.).
7 See Ellie Neiberger, Honest Services Fraud: Federal Prosecution of Public
Corruption at the State and Local Levels, FLA. BAR J., June 2010, at 82, 85 ("[Elven if the
statute is held to be unconstitutional, it is likely that Congress and/or the [state] Legislature
will move quickly to fill the gap."); see also infra Part III.
18 See Eliason, supra note 9, at 960 ("It is probably safe to say that no area of
federal criminal law has led to greater confusion and turmoil.").
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defraud."' 9 Congress amended the statute in 1909, prohibiting "any scheme
or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."20
The circuit courts, noting the statute's disjunctive phrasing,
interpreted "'scheme or artifice to defraud' to include deprivations not only
of money or property, but also of intangible rights," such as the right to
honest services. 2 ' Therefore, in the decades leading up to McNally v. United
States in 1987-the first intervention by the Supreme Court on the issue-
federal prosecutors broadly used § 134122 and § 1343,23 the substantively
similar wire-fraud statute, to charge defendants for defrauding others of both
their tangible and intangible rights, including the right to honest services.2 4
19 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2926 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987)).
20 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341) (internal quotation marks omitted). Many of
these changes were mindful of the Supreme Court's ruling in Durland v. United States, 161
U.S. 306 (1896). See George E.B. Holding, Dennis M. Duffy & John Stuart Bruce, Federal
Prosecution of State and Local Officials Using Honest Services Mail Fraud: Where's the
Line?, 32 CAMPBELL L. REv. 191, 198 (2010).
21 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926.
22 The mail-fraud statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises . . . for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any
post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or
causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered
by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives there
from, any such matter or thing . . . shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation . . . affects a
financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000
or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
23 The wire-fraud statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes
to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in
interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the
violation . . . affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not
more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
24 One commentator posited that:
In the early 1970s, creative federal prosecutors in the Northern
District of Illinois[] theorized that the "intangible right to honest services"
could be a "property" right protected by the mail fraud statute. That theory
was first accepted in a case in which a company employee accepted secret
kickbacks-the employer was deprived of its right to "honest services" of
the employee .. .. This theory spread to public corruption cases, and was
[Vol. 34:8386
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Until McNally in 1987, the federal appellate courts seemed to
approve the broad use of the statutes. Prosecutors therefore successfully used
the statutes to prosecute defendants in both the private sector, typically in the
corporate setting,25 and the public sector, typically in local and state
26
governments. For example, under a particular line of cases dealing with
public sector employees, it was determined that a public official owed a
fiduciary duty to the public and that misuse of his office for private gain
constituted fraud.27 Furthermore, an individual without formal office would
be held to be a public fiduciary if others relied on him "because of a special
relationship in the government" and if he in fact made "governmental
decisions."28 The statutes were applied broadly to those who did not hold
public office, as well.
Many commentators blasted the prosecution of individuals at the
outer boundaries of the statutes.29 For instance, in United States v. Bronston,
a lawyer was convicted of mail fraud for breaching his duty of loyalty to his
firm's clients.o In United States v. Margiotta, a local chairman of a political
party committee was convicted of mail fraud for exchanging county jobs for
political contributions.
Critics were vindicated in 1987, when the Supreme Court
disapproved of the sweeping application of the mail- and wire-fraud statutes
in McNally v. United States. 32 Paring back the federal mail-fraud statute, the
Court held that the statute applied only to the schemes and artifices
used to prosecute politicians throughout the country.
Martin, supra note 12, at 35 (citing United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.
1973)).
25 See infra Part II.B.
26 See infra notes 32, 77, 143. It is in the public sector that federalism concerns
arise. See infra Part III.B.2.
27 See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1353 (4th Cir.), aff'd in
relevant part en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
Professor Buell would describe "fiduciary duty" as "a label to designate relationships in which
one party's expectations about disclosure make nondisclosure more likely to produce a
deception that the law of fraud might want to sanction as wrongful." Samuel W. Buell, The
Court's Fraud Dud, 6 DuKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 31, 38 (2010) [hereinafter Buell, The
Court's Fraud Dudj, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1656350 (discussing the concept of
fiduciary duty). "As Justice Scalia pointed out in his concurrence in Skilling, it is not a
particularly helpful label because it only begins the inquiry." Id.
28 United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1296 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting United
States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 122 (2nd Cir. 1982)).
29 See, e.g., Buell, The Court's Fraud Dud, supra note 27, at 34.
30 United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 922 (2d Cir. 1981).
31 Margiotta, 688 F.2d at I11-12.
32 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987), overruled by Pub. L. No.
100-690, Title VII, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346); see also
Eliason, supra note 9, at 956-59. "McNally was a classic political self-dealing scheme: the
defendants used their positions of power and influence to line their own pockets while




defrauding victims of money or property, as opposed to those defrauding
citizens of their rights to good government. 3 Specifically, the Court stated:
Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its
outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal
Government in setting standards of disclosure and good
government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as
limited in scope to the protection of property rights. If
Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly
than it has.34
The Supreme Court therefore narrowed the application of § 1341 because the
concept of honest-services fraud could not exist if it did not appear explicitly
or implicitly in the statute.3 5
The following year, Congress responded by enacting § 1346, which
took the opposite approach of McNally and broadly defined "scheme or
artifice" to include depriving a person of honest services. Section 1346,
enacted by a provision of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, was just twenty-
eight words: "For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to
defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible
right of honest services."36 The new statute explicitly included, as mail and
wire fraud, schemes to deprive a person of honest services, 37 being the first
statutory introduction of the term "honest services."3 Thereafter, the
elements of a mail- or wire-fraud offense under § 1346 became: 1) a scheme
to defraud, including a material deception, 2) with the intent to defraud, 3)
using the mails, private commercial carriers, and/or wires in furtherance of
the scheme, 4) that resulted or would have resulted in the victim's
39deprivation of money, property, or honest services.
33 McNally, 483 U.S. at 360; see also Abbe David Lowell, Christopher D. Man &
Paul M. Thompson, "Not Every Wrong is a Crime": The Legal and Practical Problems with
the Federal "Honest-Services" Statute, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANc 11, 13 (2010),
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/2010/03/ ("The Supreme Court did not decide McNally
on constitutional grounds, although it noted both vagueness and federalism concerns. Instead,
the Court decided McNally on the narrower statutory ground that the mail- and wire-fraud
statutes should be interpreted in accordance with the common law definition of fraud, which
was limited to deprivations of property and not the deprivation of 'intangible rights."').
1 McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.
3s See Buell, The Court's Fraud Dud, supra note 27, at 33.
36 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, Title VII, § 7603(a), 102
Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346); see also Holding, Duffy & Bruce, supra note
20, at 207.
37 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
3 See Buell, The Court's Fraud Dud, supra note 27, at 46 ("This is not a problem
that arose accidentally just because some federal courts, and a later Congress, chose to use the
verbal formulation 'honest services' with the mail- and wire-fraud statutes. It is a general
problem for the law of fraud. Arguably it is the concept of fraud itself, not the modem
formulation of 'honest services,' that presents the vagueness difficulty.").
39 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006 & Supp. III 2009); § 1346; see also Christopher
J. Stuart, Mail and Wire Fraud, 46 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 813, 816-32 (2009) (analyzing the
elements of these offenses). For a discussion of the defenses to mail or wire fraud, see id. at
88 [Vol. 34:83
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Following the introduction of this provision in 1988, prosecutors
used the honest-services statute to target acts by private and public actors
that ranged from undisclosed self-dealing to the breach of fiduciary duties.
Often times, defendants' schemes to defraud involved intangible rights, not
just property rights.4 o
Over these years, hundreds of defendants received federal jail terms
under the statute, even if they fell at its margins.4 1 The penalties for white-
collar crime were intentionally stiff,42 increasing over the years43 and
provoking criticism.44
Furthermore, the acts targeted by prosecutors under the statute were
many and varied. For example, in United States v. Frost, defendant
professors at the University of Tennessee were convicted of mail fraud for
allowing defendant students to plagiarize their theses or dissertations. The
court determined that, as a result of this fraud, the University was deprived of
its right to the honest services of its employees.4 5 In United States v. Gray,
832-33.
40 See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
41 Buell, The Court's Fraud Dud, supra note 27, at 34. "The controversy over
honest services fraud prosecutions, of course, has the major added element of being a
controversy over whether the deceptive party ought to go to prison rather than simply pay
damages." Id. at 42.
42 "For traditional violations of §§ 1341 and 1343, sentencing is subject to the
'Offenses Involving Fraud and Deceit' provisions of the Guide-lines. Each mailing constitutes
a separate count of mail fraud." Stuart, supra note 39, at 834.
43 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903(a)-(b), 116
Stat. 745, 805 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343); see also Eliason, supra note
9, at 974 n.198 ("In 2002, as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislative reforms, the maximum
penalty for [mail and wire fraud] was increased to twenty years [in prison]."); Note, Go
Directly to Jail: White Collar Sentencing After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 122 HARV. L. REv.
1728, 1732 n.27 (2009) (noting higher fraud sentences following the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act). In fact, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines initially arose, in large part, to remedy
the previously lenient treatment of white-collar criminals. Stephen Breyer, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1, 22 (1988). But see Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States
Attorneys, 6 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 426 (2009) [hereinafter Beale, Rethinking the Identity
and Role of United States Attorneys] (noting that, since the introduction of the Guidelines,
sentences in some districts have generally been lighter than the national averages). For an
excellent discussion of the development of the Sentencing Guidelines on white-collar crime,
see generally Derick R. Vollrath, Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just
Sentencing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DuKE L.J. 1001 (2010).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Twenty-
five years is a long sentence for a white collar crime, longer than the sentences routinely
imposed by many states for violent crimes, including murder, or other serious crimes such as
serial child molestation."); Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling's Martyrdom: The Case for
Criminalization Without Incarceration, 44 U.S.F. L. REv. 459 (2010); Ellen S. Podgor, The
Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 741-52 (2007).
45 United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 369 (6th Cir. 1997). But see United States
v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1993) (The court reversed a mail-fraud conviction against
a sports agent who had caused universities to pay scholarship money to athletes who had
become ineligible. The defendant made legitimate money in the market due to the fraud
2011] 89
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basketball coaches at Baylor University were convicted of mail fraud for
helping five players commit academic dishonesty in order to obtain credits
required for academic eligibility and potential scholarships.46 In United
States v. Rybicki, personal injury lawyers were convicted of mail fraud for
arranging payment to insurance claims adjusters to expedite clients'
settlement of claims.47 In United States v. Hausmann, a Wisconsin personal
injury lawyer who referred his clients to a chiropractor in return for payment
from the chiropractor4 8 was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail and wire
fraud.49 In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, an
agricultural cooperative was convicted under § 1343 when one of its vice-
presidents convinced a partner at the cooperative's law firm to funnel illegal
contributions to a political candidate.o
Criticism of the continued broad use of the mail- and wire-fraud
statutes began to mount again, but the Supreme Court did not take any
relevant cases immediately after McNally." In 2009, however, in his dissent
from the denial of certiorari in a case that would have addressed the breadth
of § 1346, Justice Scalia noted that the honest-services doctrine needed to be
addressed.52 The following year, the Court granted certiorari to three cases
dealing with the honest-services doctrine, resulting in the highly anticipated
trilogy of decisions handed down by the Supreme Court that again narrowed
the honest-services doctrine.
scheme, but the court held that "only a scheme to obtain money or other property from the
victim by fraud violates § 1341. . . . Losses that occur as byproducts of a deceitful scheme do
not satisfy the statutory requirement.").
46 United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1996).
47 United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2003).
48 United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 952 (7th Cir. 2003).
49 Id. at 954.
so United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 138 F.3d 961, 969-70
(D.C. Cir. 1998). The D.C. Circuit noted with concern that each act of an employee's
dishonesty could be transformed into a federal crime by the use of the mails or wires. Id. at
973. Of course, over the years the definition of mails and wires has greatly expanded to
include transmissions through facsimile, telex, modem, and the Internet. See, e.g., United
States v. Ross, 210 F.3d 916, 920 (8th Cir. 2000) (involving facsimile); United States v.
Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 57 (2d Cir. 1998) (involving telephone calls); United States v.
Carrington, 96 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1996) (involving facsimile and computer modems); see also
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 250006(1),
108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1341) (broadening application of the mail-
fraud statute to "any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or
commercial interstate carrier").
51 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), overruled by Pub. L. No. 100-
690, Title VII, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346).
- 52 Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1311 (2009) (mem.) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("I would grant the petition for certiorari and squarely confront both the meaning
and the constitutionality of § 1346.").
[Vol. 34:8390
HONEST-SER VICES DOCTRINE
B. The Supreme Court's Trilogy of Honest-Services Cases
The Supreme Court's trilogy included Skilling v. United States,53
Black v. United States,54 and Weyhrauch v. United States.55 All three cases
raised questions regarding federal fraud law and presented challenges to the
honest-services doctrine. Two of the cases related to the activities of
executives of public companies, 56 while the third case related to an Alaska
state legislator.5 7
United States v. Skilling dealt with the conviction of Jeffrey Skilling,
an Enron executive. In 2001, Enron Corporation famously shocked its
shareholders and 22,000 employees by crashing into bankruptcy, despite
being the seventh highest-revenue-grossing company in the United States at
that time. The crash followed the revelation of vast corporate fraud, which
extended to the corporate books.59
The indictment of Skilling accused him of contributing to the fraud
by attempting to hide Enron's true financial condition by "manipulating
Enron's publicly reported financial results; .. . making public statements and
representations about Enron's financial performance and results that were
false and misleading."6 0 Skilling benefited from this scheme through
enhancements to his compensation package, including his salary, bonuses,
and various stock options.6 1 The indictment charged Skilling with, among
other things, seeking to "depriv[e] Enron and its shareholders of the
intangible right of [his] honest services."62 Skilling was ultimately found
guilty of nineteen counts, including the charge of conspiracy to commit
honest-services fraud.63 He was sentenced to 292 months in prison, 3 years of
supervised release, and payment of $45 million in restitution to his victims.6
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Skilling
challenged his convictions on several grounds, arguing, inter alia, that the
honest-services doctrine was unconstitutionally vague and that he was denied
s3 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
54 Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010).
5 Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (mem.) (per curiam).
s6 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896; Black, 130 S. Ct. 2963.
5 Weyhrauch, 130 S. Ct. 2971.
" Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907.
5 Id. See generally BETHANY MACLEAN & PETER ELKIND, SMARTEST Guys IN
THE RooM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (Penguin 2003).
60 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2908 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 Id.
62 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Gopalan, supra note 44, at
486-503; Nancy J. King, Introduction: Skilling v. United States, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANc 1
(2010), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/2010/03/.
63 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2911.
64 Id.
65 United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
2011] 9 1
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a fair trial. 6 The Fifth Circuit upheld Skilling's conviction, neglecting to
address the argument that the honest-services doctrine was unconstitutionally
vague. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, making Skilling the first case
in the honest-services trilogy.
United States v. Black, the second case in the trilogy, addressed the
prosecution of Conrad Black, a top executive of Hollinger International.
Black was convicted of mail fraud based on the government's charges that he
deprived the company of his honest services by stealing millions of dollars
from the company by fraudulently paying himself phony "noncompetition
fees" without disclosing his receipt of those fees. On appeal, Black
challenged the validity of the jury instructions on the charge of honest-
services fraud.7 0 The Seventh Circuit upheld his conviction, as well as those
of the other Hollinger executives. 7 1 The Supreme Court granted review on
the question of whether 18 U.S.C. § 1346 applied wherein a private
individual's scheme to defraud did not contemplate economic or other
property harm to the person to whom honest services were owed.72
Finally, the Court's review of United States v. Weyhrauch"
concerned Bruce Weyhrauch's conviction arising out of his activities as a
member of the Alaska House of Representatives in 2006.74 During this time,
while Alaska's legislature was considering altering the state's practice of oil
production taxation, Weyhrauch solicited future legal work from an oil field
services company in exchange for voting in that company's favor.75 Federal
prosecutors charged Weyhrauch with violating § 1346, alleging that his
relationship with VECO deprived Alaska citizens of their intangible right to
his honest services as a government official.76 Weyhrauch typified an honest-
services defendant in the context of the public sector.
In Weyhrauch's case, the government initiated an interlocutory
appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on an evidentiary ruling subject
to a circuit split: Whether an honest-services mail fraud prosecution required
proof of a violation of applicable state law. The Ninth Circuit decided that
66 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2911.
67 Id. at 2912.
68 United States v. Black, 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2966 (2010).
69 Id. at 2967.
7o Id. at 2968.
" Id. at 2970.
72 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Black, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (No. 08-876); see also
Buell, The Court's Fraud Dud, supra note 27, at 35.
n United States v. Weyhrauch, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (mem.) (per curiam).
74 United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated per
curiam, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (mem.).
7 Id. at 1239.
76 Id. at 1239-40.
n Buell, The Court's Fraud Dud, supra note 27, at 34-35; see also supra note 32
and accompanying text (discussing McNally as an example of a classic political, self-dealing
scheme).
78 Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1239.
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it did not.79 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari on the
question of whether 18 U.S.C. § 1346 applied when a private individual's
scheme to defraud did not contemplate economic or other property harm to
the person to whom honest services were owed.80
Although each of these cases implicated some aspect of the honest-
services doctrine, the Court only addressed the honest-services fraud
question on its merits in Skilling v. United States, remanding the others to be
decided in light of Skilling. Choosing to narrow § 1346's breadth rather than
invalidating it, the Court relied on the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which
only Skilling raised in his appeal.' However, the Court refrained from
extensively addressing mail- and wire-fraud law even in Skilling, focusing
more on the jury questions also raised in the case.82 Some commentators
have expressed disappointment that the Supreme Court did not utilize this
opportunity to substantively address criminal fraud law. 83
In Skilling, the Supreme Court principally considered what conduct
Congress criminalized by "proscribing fraudulent deprivations of the
intangible right of honest services." 84 If too broad and unclear, § 1346 risked
being unconstitutionally vague. The Court began its void-for-vagueness
analysis by determining that Congress, in enacting § 1346, intended to
reinstate the pre-McNally meaning of honest-services fraud.8 5 The Supreme
Court held that this meant only the core of honest-services cases before
" Id. at 1248.
80 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Weyhrauch, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1196); see
also Buell, The Court's Fraud Dud, supra note 27, at 34.
81 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2925-35 (2010).
82 See id. at 2912-25.
83 See, e.g., Buell, The Court's Fraud Dud, supra note 27, at 45 ("Supreme Court
opinions, of course, almost always open up new issues and fail to resolve old ones. The more
serious deficit in the Skilling opinion is the missed opportunity to grapple seriously with the
relationship and context problem in the law of fraud."). Buell notes that the Court did not even
significantly address mens rea in Skilling, one of the starting points in substantive criminal
law. Id. at 47. Buell suggests that the Court's analysis could have been more helpful, although
not necessarily complete, if the Court elaborated on several relevant points:
First, the Court could have said that not everyone owes this
special duty that Congress chose to designate with the term "honest
services." Second, the Court could have said that, even among those who
owe such a duty, the content of that duty is not uniform-it may demand a
little extra of the actor bearing it or a lot. Third, the Court could have said
that there is no actionable fraud unless the person to whom that duty is
owed is not only deceived but suffers some harm-in the form of direct
loss, being placed at a risk the person has a right to be free of, or being
deprived of the ability to exit a relationship in circumstances in which exit
likely would have been chosen.
Id. at 46. Buell recognizes that these shortcomings were likely the result of the Court's limits
as "a voting body with nine members," with a majority necessary to make law. Id. at 47.
84 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1346) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 739 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jolly &
DeMoss, J.J., dissenting) (noting the scant legislative history surrounding 18 U.S.C. § 1346).
81 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928.
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McNally "derailed the intangible-rights theory of fraud"M--bribery or
kickback schemes in violation of a fiduciary duty.8 7 The Court therefore held
that the statute was intended to encompass only kickbacks and bribes." By
limiting the statute in this way, the Court determined that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague.89
Justice Scalia's concurrence noted that there was no discemable core
of pre-McNally honest-services cases.90 No case prior to Skilling, including
McNally, mentioned such an abundance of cases dealing specifically with
bribery and kickback schemes.9' Justice Scalia also noted that even if such a
core of cases did exist, it would not necessarily be free of unconstitutional
vagueness problems.92 Justice Scalia would have found the statute
unconstitutionally vague, and he objected to the majority's notion that the
broad and unconstitutionally vague parts of the law could be pared down to a
more narrow, less vague, and, therefore, constitutional interpretation of §
1346.93 The substance of this concurrence was hardly surprising, having been
94foreshadowed a year earlier by Justice Scalia in another case.
The majority's interpretation of the statute, however, seems to have
been influenced by an amicus curiae brief filed in Weyhrauch that advocated
that the Court limit the statute to "cases of bribes and kickbacks."9' In its
8 Id. at 2928, 2931.
87 Id. at 2930 (citing United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir.
1987)); see also Eliason, supra note 9, at 968 ("The heartland of public sector honest services
fraud therefore involves cases where the wrongful conduct at issue amounts to bribery or self-
dealing: the official's performance of his or her official duties is influenced in exchange for
some personal gain.").
8 Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931.
89 id
90 See id. at 2935-39 (Scalia, J., concurring). However, the majority did concede
that the pre-McNally honest-services cases had "occasioned disagreement among the Courts of
Appeals." Id. at 2930 (majority opinion).
9' See id. at 2936 (Scalia, J., concurring).
92 Id. at 2938. Some commentators have also suggested that paring back the
statute to bribery and kickbacks would still not be workable. See Timothy P. O'Toole, The
Honest-Services Surplus: Why There's No Need (or Place) for a Federal Law Prohibiting
"Criminal-esque" Conduct in the Nature of Bribes and Kickbacks, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANc 49, 50 (2010), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/2010/03/ ("In the end, there is
simply no textual basis in the law for limiting [the statute's] scope to bribery and kickbacks.").
9 See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2938-39 (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Martin,
supra note 12, at 37 ("The hitch in declaring the honest services statute unconstitutional is the
judge-made exception that, outside the First Amendment, a law should not be declared facially
vague unless it is vague in all its applications."). Further, Justice Scalia opined that the
majority's assertion that, in enacting § 1346, Congress intended to only proscribe bribery or
kickback schemes was "false." Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2939 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
94 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
9 Brief of Albert W. Alschuler as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
3, Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1196), 2009 WL 3052480.
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brief in the Skilling case, the government adopted the same position, with
none of the parties strongly protesting it.96
As Skilling's alleged misconduct did not include bribery or
kickbacks, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's ruling on the
honest-services conspiracy conviction, remanding the case for further
proceedings. The Court also remanded Black and Weyhrauch to be decided
in light of Skilling. In the process, the Court changed the legal landscape of
white-collar crime, but left the future of the honest-services doctrine far from
certain given the potential for renewed Congressional action.
C. The Future of the Honest-Services Doctrine
The Supreme Court's trilogy of decisions has left the honest-services
law in its pre-McNally form, as interpreted by the Court and within the
restrictions of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. As such, the honest-services
doctrine is now limited to activities involving bribery and kickbacks.9 8
From here, the honest-services doctrine might develop in one of two
main ways. First, § 1346 might remain applicable only to bribery and
kickbacks, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the absence of
Congressional action,99 although prosecutors may decide to push the limits of
the terms "bribery," "kickbacks," and "property" in the circuit courts.'00
Alternatively, Congress might respond to the Supreme Court's trilogy of
decisions with new legislation.
If the Supreme Court's interpretation of the honest-services doctrine
remains in the absence of Congressional action, some, but not all, aspects of
white-collar criminal prosecution may change. For example, soon after the
Supreme Court's trilogy of decisions, mail-fraud prosecutions involving a
deprivation of money or property continued.' 0 However, prosecutors might
now attempt, with some success, to expand the definition of "bribery" and
"kickbacks." 02 Prosecutors might also push the boundaries of the meaning
96 O'Toole, supra note 92, at 50.
97 See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2934-35.
98 See supra Part II.B.
99 See supra Part II.B.
100 See infra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
101 Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud Prosecutions Continue Despite Skilling Decision -
Univision Services, Inc. to Pay One Million, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG (July 27,
2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime blog/2010/07/mail-fraud-
prosecutions-continue-despite-skilling-decision-univision-services-inc-to-pay-one-
million.html ("Many believed that there would be difficulty in bringing mail fraud cases if the
Supreme Court removed honest services from the statute. . .. But what often goes unnoticed,
is that most mail fraud cases are not prosecuted under section 1346, the honest services
statute. Most involve a deprivation of money or property, and these cases continue to be
allowed.").
102 See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n Criminal Def. Lawyers, supra note 11 (Cynthia
Hujar Orr, President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, expects "to
see future litigation surrounding efforts by prosecutors to wedge their cases into the 'bribe or
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of property, hoping to encompass intangible property rights. Finally, the
circuit courts might expand the contours of honest services in the numerous
cases they will hear on remand in light of Skilling.104
Alternatively, Congress may further alter the honest-services
doctrine by legislating in response to the Court's trilogy. For example,
Congress might determine that the pre-McNally core of cases were not just
limited to bribery and kickbacks, as the Supreme Court held. Congress might
also speak clearly in proscribing fraud schemes beyond bribery and
kickbacks, determining that such action is constitutionally sound. In such a
case, Congress might broaden the definition of "property" under the statute
or define aspects of fiduciary duties differently from the current
interpretation of honest services.os Or, Congress might decide to criminalize
undisclosed self-dealing. However, in an unusual type of instructive
footnote,106 the Supreme Court suggested the difficulties with criminalizing
undisclosed self-dealing:
If Congress were to take up the enterprise of criminalizing
"undisclosed self-dealing by a public official or private
employee," it would have to employ standards of sufficient
definiteness and specificity to overcome due process
concerns. The Government proposes a standard that
prohibits the "taking of official action by the employee that
furthers his own undisclosed financial interests while
purporting to act in the interests of those to whom he owes a
fiduciary duty," so long as the employee acts with a specific
intent to deceive and the undisclosed conduct could
influence the victim to change its behavior. That
formulation, however, leaves many questions unanswered.
How direct or significant does the conflicting financial
interest have to be? To what extent does the official action
have to further that interest in order to amount to fraud? To
whom should the disclosure be made and what information
should it convey? These questions and others call for
kickback' paradigm to which the Court has now limited this statute.").
103 Buell, The Court's Fraud Dud, supra note 27, at 46.
'0 See, e.g., Siegelman v. United States, 561 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated,
130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010) (mem.); Hargrove v. United States, 579 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2009),
vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (mem.); Hereimi v. United States, 357 F. App'x 82 (9th Cir.
2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (mem.); Harris v. United States, 313 F. App'x 969 (9th
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010) (mem.); Redzic v. United States, 569 F.3d 841
(8th Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (mem.); see also Ellen S. Podgor, Skilling
Decision Brings Down Scrushy, Siegelman, Hargrove, and Hereimi, WHITE COLLAR CRIME
PROF BLOG (June 29, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrimeblog/
2010/06/skilling-decision-brings-down-scrushy-siegelman-hargrove-and-hereimi.html.
105 Buell, The Court's Fraud Dud, supra note 27, at 46.
106 See id at 36 ("[T]he majority went so far as the extraordinary step of warning
Congress in a footnote that any effort to expand the mail fraud statute further would have to
navigate through perilous constitutional shoals.").
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particular care in attempting to formulate an adequate
criminal prohibition in this context.10 7
Whatever changes Congress decides to make to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of honest services, however, it "would have to employ
standards of sufficient definiteness and specificity to overcome due process
concerns." 08 In other words, "If Congress desires to go further . . . it must
speak more clearly than it has."' 09 Two times, already, Congress has failed to
speak clearly enough, but perhaps the third attempt would be successful in
withstanding judicial scrutiny and more permanently changing the legal
landscape of the honest-services doctrine."o
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRILOGY OF HONEST-
SERVICES CASES
There are several implications of the Supreme Court's trilogy that
narrowed the honest-services doctrine. As lawmakers decide whether and
how to further legislate on this topic, and as the doctrine continues to
develop in the federal courts,"' it is essential to analyze the implications of
the trilogy, which suggest that the future of honest services depends on the
application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the workings of
governmental checks and balances.
A. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
The void-for-vagueness doctrine played a central role in Skilling."2
It drove the majority's decision, resulting in the narrowing of the honest-
107 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933 n.45 (2010) (citations omitted).
108 id.
109 Id. at 2933 (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
110 Of course, the temptation continues to be to draft a broad law on the subject
given the advantages of such broadness. See infra note 125 and accompanying text; see also
O'Toole, supra note 92, at 59 ("If the Court strikes down the honest-services law, what
happens next? The Department of Justice will almost certainly seek a new law with the main
perceived benefit of the old one-unlimited flexibility.").
"'1 See supra Part II.C; infra Part III.B.1.
112 However, void-for-vagueness was only one aspect of the decision. In fact, the
Court's decision extended well beyond strict white-collar criminal law and into federal
criminal jury trial issues and statutory interpretation. The prominence of these other issues
may have resulted in a more cursory exploration of the issues squarely at the center of the
honest-services debate. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, An Honest Services Debate, 8 Omo ST. J.
CRiM. L. 251, 271 (2010) [hereinafter Beale, An Honest Services Debate], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1661433 ("Precisely because the Court
did not engage these criminal justice concerns, the Skilling opinion prompted the debate's
exploration of other issues that are less often the focus of criminal law scholarship: the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the standards governing facial versus as-applied
challenges, the proper methodology for interpreting statutes, and institutional concerns
regarding the federal judiciary and its relationship to the other branches of government. These
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services doctrine, and animated Justice Scalia's argument that the honest-
services statute should be entirely voided. All of the Justices considered the
honest-services doctrine, as argued by the government in Skilling, to be
unconstitutionally vague." 3 The Court's majority, however, viewed the
statute as salvageable when narrowed,'14 while the concurring Justices,
consisting of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, viewed the statute as
unconstitutionally vague." 5
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is "among the most important
guarantees of liberty under law."" 6 For over one hundred years, the Supreme
Court has invalidated statutes that were unconstitutionally uncertain." 7
Ironically, the doctrine has itself been criticized for being vague.
Nonetheless, in City of Chicago v. Morales,"9 the Court noted two
circumstances in which vagueness could invalidate a criminal law: "First,
[the invalid law] may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable
ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may
authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 20
issues have generally been seen as the province of scholars specializing in constitutional law,
federal courts, legislation, and public choice theory.").
113 For background on the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see generally Andrew E.
Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 279 (2003). For background on facial vagueness and vagueness as applied, see John
F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal
Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. REv. 241, 275-84 (2002). For a comparative treatment of the doctrine in
American and French law, see Patricia Rrapi, La Mauvaise Qualite de la Loi: Vagueness
Doctrine at the French Constitutional Council, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243 (2010).
114 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2929 (2010) ("It has long been our
practice, however, before striking a federal statute as impermissibly vague, to consider
whether the prescription is amenable to a limiting construction." (citation omitted)).
"5 Id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring).
116 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 102 (1996).
" See Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the
Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETmIcs J. 255, 263-64 (2010).
11 Some commentators have therefore suggested changes to this doctrine. See,
e.g., id. at 257 (Lockwood argues that the sole requirement for vagueness should be that the
law's language did not provide fair notice of the prohibited conduct and suggests the adoption
of a strict facial review standard "such that a law must be determined to be unconstitutionally
vague in all of its applications before it can be invalidated in its entirety.").
119 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). For commentary on this case,
see generally Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism about Police
Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. REv. 141 (1999).
120 Morales, 527 U.S. at 56 (citation omitted). An example of an area in which the
law is argued to be unconstitutionally vague is the definition of "pornography" in the context
of sentencing imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), under which defendants convicted
of federal child pornography crimes are often subject to supervised release conditions that
proscribe any possession of "pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating
material." See, e.g., United States v. Wilkinson, 282 Fed. App'x 750, 752 (11th Cir. 2008). In
this context, the Supreme Court has not determined whether the term "pornography" is
unconstitutionally vague or overly broad, and the circuits are generally split on the issue. Id. at
754; see also Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, Note, "Mother of Mercy-Is This The End ofRico?"-
Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for- Vagueness Challenge to RICO "Pattern", 65
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The doctrine is rooted in due process concerns. In Connally v.
General Construction Co.,121 an early case on the vagueness doctrine, the
Court explained that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential
of due process of law." 22
During oral arguments in United States v. Black, the Justices
uniformly noted the ambiguities in the honest-services statute, which verged
on being fatal to the statute. Justice Breyer posited: "So every instance in
which a worker does not provide honest services to the employer, he has met
your test. I think there are 300-perhaps there are 150 million workers in the
United States. I think possibly 140 of them would flunk your test." 2 3 Justice
Breyer raised, as an example of a violation of the honest-services doctrine,
an employee's compliment to a boss in order to usher the boss out of the
office so that the employee may return to personal business.124 An even more
universal example is an employee's use of the Internet for personal reasons
during job hours. Under a broad interpretation of the honest-services
doctrine, therefore, almost every employee would become a federal criminal,
and this broadness verged on ambiguity.
Before being invalidated by the Supreme Court on these grounds, §
1346's broad language had many advantages for prosecutors, allowing the
honest-services statute to be molded to fit many fraudulent schemes
incapable of prospective definition and prohibition. 125 Unsurprisingly,
defenders of the statute argued to federal appellate courts, quite successfully,
that Congress had intended the language of § 1341 to be broad and flexible
in order to implicate a wide range of fraudulent schemes.126 However, even if
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1106 (1990) (discussing the void-for-vagueness doctrine in the RICO
context); Derrick Moore, Note, "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude": Why the Void-For-
Vagueness Argument is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 813, 839
(2008) (arguing that "crimes involving moral turpitude" are unconstitutionally vague).
121 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
122 Id. at 391 (citing Int'l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1912)).
123 Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, United States v. Black, 130 S. Ct. 2963
(2010) (No. 08-876), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/
argument transcripts/08-876.pdf. For commentary on the implications of Justice Breyer's
point, see generally Julie R. O'Sullivan, Honest-Services Fraud: A (Vague) Threat to Millions
of Blissfully Unaware (and Non-Culpable) American Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANc 23
(2010), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/2010/03/.
124 Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Black, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (No. 08-876).
125 See, e.g., Thomas Fredrick Rybarczyk, Comment, Preserving a More Perfect
Union: Melding Two Circuits' Approaches to Save a Valuable Weapon in the Fight against
Political Corruption, 2011 Wis. L. REV. 101 (forthcoming 2011), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1624700.
126 See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1945); United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d
588, 602 (2d Cir. 1973)) ("The broad language of the statute, intended by Congress to be
sufficiently flexible to cover the wide range of fraudulent schemes mankind is capable of
devising, is not unconstitutionally vague because § 1341 contains the requirement that the
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this were the intention of Congress, such an intention could not in itself
determine the constitutionality of the statute as Congress cannot intend to be
ambiguous in its legislating or to create other fundamentally unconstitutional
legislation.' 27 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court presumed in Skilling that
Congress operated within the same interpretation of the constitutional
framework as the Court, and did not aim for ambiguity: "Apprised that a
broader reading of § 1346 could render the statute impermissibly vague,
Congress, we believe, would have drawn the honest-services line, as we do
now, at bribery and kickback schemes." 2 8
One of the most significant dangers of any vague statute, of course,
is the opportunity for prosecutorial abuse.12 9 This is particularly true in
honest-services cases given that anyone can be targeted under the statute,
including political enemies.130 And, of course, a vague statute has due
process concerns, risking invalidation at the hands of the Supreme Court, as
was nearly the case in Skilling.'3' Therefore, although the honest-services
doctrine has survived many vagueness challenges,1 32 the void-for-vagueness
defendant must have acted willfully and with a specific intent to defraud.").
127 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010). National uniformity
might help decrease the ambiguity. In Skilling, the Supreme Court interpreted its decision as
"establish[ing] a uniform national standard, defin[ing] honest services with clarity, reach[ing]
only seriously culpable conduct, and accomplish[ing] Congress's goal of 'overruling'
McNally." Id. at 2933 (citation omitted).
128 Id. at 2931 n.43.
129 See Rybarczyk, supra note 125, at 104. One author suggests a limit on
prosecutorial discretion through prosecutorial self-policing, as guided by the United States
Attorney's Manual, which states:
Prosecutions of fraud ordinarily should not be undertaken if the
scheme employed consists of some isolated transactions between
individuals, involving minor loss to the victims, in which cases the parties
should be left to settle their differences by civil or criminal litigation in the
state courts. Serious consideration, however, should be given to the
prosecution of any scheme which in its nature is directed to defraud a
class of persons, or the general public, with a substantial pattern of
conduct.
Mathew N. Brown, Current Development, Prosecutorial Discretion and Federal Mail Fraud
Prosecutions for Honest Services Fraud, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETucs 667, 673 (2008) (quoting
U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-43.100 (1997),
http://www. ustice.gov/usao/eousa/foia readingroom/usam/title9/43mcrm.htm).
See infra Part III.B.2; see also Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of
United States Attorneys, supra note 43, at 417 (noting prosecutorial discretion may be used for
improper partisan reasons, such as accelerating or delaying charges so as to influence an
election, or bringing charges against political opponents). See generally Alexa Lawson-
Remer, Note, Rightful Prosecution or Wrongful Prosecution? Abuse of Honest Services Fraud
for Political Purposes, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 1289 (2009) (analyzing the potential for abuse of
honest services in pursuit of political goals).
131 See supra Part II.B.
132 See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 129 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The
broad language of the statute, intended by Congress to be sufficiently flexible to cover the
wide range of fraudulent schemes mankind is capable of devising, is not unconstitutionally
vague because [§] 1341 contains the requirement that the defendant must have acted willfully
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doctrine may remain the gravest threat to the development of the honest-
services doctrine.
B. The Checks and Balances
There are many checks and balances built into American
governance, between not only the branches of the Federal Government, but
also between the State and Federal Governments. All of the jostling over the
proper contours of the honest-services doctrine illustrates and tests these
checks and balances, which form the cornerstone of the American system.
1. Between Legislatures and Courts
The development of the honest-services doctrine has resembled a
match between the Supreme Court and Congress: The Court's trilogy of
cases is the fourth attempt by one of the branches to determine the contours
of the honest-services doctrine-the Court's second.1 13 Even Congress's
enactment of § 1346 in 1988 stemmed from a desire to circumvent the
Court's decision in McNally, which limited the federal mail-fraud statute to
deprivations of tangible property.134 It would therefore be unsurprising if
Congress circumvents the Supreme Court's trilogy with new legislation,
further energizing the match between the branches even though, ironically,
the void-for-vagueness doctrine-the grounds for the Court's most recent
reform of the honest-services doctrine-has been described as the final check
on legislatures and state courts. 135
The void-for-vagueness doctrine has also been described as an
opportunity for the courts to evade a full analysis of certain constitutional
issues, such as permissible behavior and relationships under the Constitution,
in favor of a limited strike on a law.136 Indeed, in Skilling, the Court came
close to voiding § 1346, though it ultimately decided to narrow the statute
instead.'37 The Court was also able to largely avoid addressing the substance
of fraud law by relying on vagueness, even though such a substantive
discussion could have better guide legislators. 3 8
and with a specific intent to defraud."); United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th
Cir. 1978); see also Martin, supra note 12, at 37 ("The lower courts have struggled to save the
'honest services' statute by engrafting various limiting principles. But the limiting principles
have been far from uniform.").
133 See Buell, The Court's FraudDud, supra note 27, 36 n.25 ("This was, after all,
a third volley in an inter-branch engagement, albeit one that had seen 25 years of quiet.").
134 See supra Part II.B.
"' Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic
Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 CALiF. L. REv. 541, 553 (1994).
136 See Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social
Orders, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 491, 507 (1994).
137 See supra Part II.B.
138 See supra notes 83, 111 and accompanying text.
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There is, however, the always-present danger of one branch's
encroachment on another despite the system's checks and balances. In one of
Skilling's footnotes, for example, the Supreme Court seemed suspiciously
anxious to guide the Congressional drafting of future relevant legislation. 3
The Court, at the very least, is likely correct in its expectation that honest
services will continue to be the subject of legislation1 4 0 and that the checks
and balances inherent to the system will prevent one branch from dominating
honest-services law.
2. Between State and Federal Governments
The honest-services doctrine implicates the balance between State
and Federal Governments on several points, with federalism emerging as a
major theme in Skilling.14 1 The main issue is the prosecution of state and
local officials under federal fraud law, independent of state law.142 In fact,
most of the politicians prosecuted under § 1346 have been local and state,
not federal, officials. 143 Such a lack of limits on the possible targets of a
statute potentially creates problems in criminal law, especially when a
federal statute could be used against local and state officials in an overbroad
manner.1
This issue, however, was not resolved by the Supreme Court in its
trilogy of decisions. Commentators have described this omission as a missed
opportunity to address an important aspect of the honest-services doctrine. 45
The Court's decisions in these cases, however, showed some consideration
of an amicus curiae brief filed by Professor Albert Alschuler, which raised
139 See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933 n.45 (2010); supra notes
107-110 and accompanying text; see also Beale, An Honest Services Debate, supra note 112,
at 269 ("The Skilling decision encroached on the policymaking authority of the Department of
Justice and Congress, though they may be unable or unwilling to respond effectively.").
140 "[H]onest services fraud is the subject of legislation currently pending before
Congress and the Florida Legislature. Federal S.B. 49, the Public Corruption Prosecution
Improvements Act, proposes to increase the statute of limitations from five to six years and
expand the statute to include schemes to obtain 'any other thing of value."' Neiberger, supra
note 17, at 85. The Florida legislation aimed to create a state crime of honest-services fraud,
but the bill was withdrawn from legislative consideration. Id.
141 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 129, at 679 (Though such challenges have largely
failed, "[fjederalism concerns have been raised against the national intrusion into state
affairs.").
142 See infra notes 144, 147-150 and accompanying text.
143 Eliason, supra note 9, at 969.
'" Beale, An Honest Services Debate, supra note 112, at 260-61; see also
Rybarczyk, supra note 125, at 123-24 (discussing potential determinations as to the targets of
§ 1346).
145 Beale, An Honest Services Debate, supra note 112, at 262 ("After all, we are
talking about a statute that is employed to prosecute state and local government officials, with
all of the issues that it raises: federalism, the danger of politically motivated use of
prosecutorial discretion, and the potential to chill political activity.").
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the issue of federalism in criminal law and the states' abilities to prescribe
criminal law.14 6
One proposed limit to the honest-services doctrine to resolve some
of these federalism concernsl47 is to require a state law violation independent
of the honest-services violation before commencing prosecution under the
honest-services statute.14 8 Without requiring a state law violation, federal
law, under the guise of the honest-services statute, defines "the ethical
obligations that elected state officials and other state employees owe to their
respective state governments." 49 Nonetheless, substantive federalism
concerns did not plague the majority in Skilling, and, therefore, this issue was
not extensively considered.5 o
There is also the issue of federal common law crimes.1st In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia noted that "in transforming the prohibition of
'honest-services fraud' into a prohibition of 'bribery and kick-backs' [the
Court] is wielding a power we long ago abjured: the power to define new
federal crimes."'5 2 Again, however, the majority was not inclined to
substantively resolve this point.
In addition to the determinations of the appropriate contours of
federal and state criminal law, there remains the unanswered question of the
boundaries of criminal law generally.' This is especially true given some
commentators' recognition of the general penchant for
146 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
147 One author proposes another solution to federalism concerns: "[I]f § 1346 were
drafted using more precise, definite language-without micromanaging state affairs-then
federalism-based criticisms of honest services fraud might be quieted to a large extent."
Huigens, supra note 13, at 1714.
148 See, e.g., Van Strander, supra note 13, at 81 (describing the issue before the
Supreme Court in Weyhrauch). However, "the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all
rejected the principle that in order to sustain an honest services fraud charge, an underlying
state statute must be shown to have been violated." Matthew Modell, (Dis)honest Services
Fraud: "Bad Men, Like Good Men, Are Entitled to Be Tried and Sentenced in Accordance
with Law", 32 N.C. CENT. L. REv. 131, 138 (2010).
149 Lowell, Man & Thompson, supra note 33, at 19.
150 See also Van Strander, supra note 13, at 85 ("While the Ninth Circuit
ultimately declined to adopt the state-law limiting principle [in Weyhrauch], it noted that the
Brumley decision addressed all of the various federalist concerns by doing so. The Brumley
holding sets clear boundaries for federal honest-services fraud liability by limiting its scope to
preexisting state law, thus preventing federal overreaching into state affairs."). "In declining to
adopt the state-law limiting principle, the [Ninth Circuit] cited United States v. Louderman,
which held that state law plays no role in a court's determination whether a federal fraud
statute has been violated." Id. at 86.
151 "Although the proscription of federal common-law crimes may be swaddled in
the blanket of federalism, the two principles are nevertheless distinct and merit separate
consideration." Huigens, supra note 13, at 1713.
152 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812)); see also Modell, supra note 148, at 131
(noting the roblem with honest-services fraud in the context of common law crime).
' See Beale, An Honest Services Debate, supra note 112, at 271.
1032011]
HAMLINE LAWREVIEW
"overcriminalization."l 54 On the other hand, corruption is a major problem
with real costs to efficiency, fairness, and transparency-whether in the
context of corrupt corporations or corrupt governments.'ss It is in the pursuit
of the end of corruption, however, that questions arise regarding the potential
and ideal scope of relevant legislation, as well as the harshness of white-
collar crime sentencing.' 6 Indeed, there is no simplicity in the issues
triggered by the establishment of the proper contours of the criminalization
of corruption.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, although Skilling limited the honest-services statute, several
concurring Justices would have invalidated it as unconstitutionally vague.
This division of opinion has characterized the honest-services doctrine's
entire existence, representing the greater debate on the topic among
commentators, federal courts, and Congress. Nonetheless, Skilling and its
companion cases dramatically altered the legal landscape of white-collar
crime by restricting the qualifying acts under the honest-services doctrine to
bribery and kickbacks. This decision comes twenty-two years after Congress
enacted the honest-services statute and responds to much of the criticism
regarding the doctrine's previously broad application.
The results of the trilogy remain to be seen: prosecutors may seek
other avenues to prosecution, or Congress may legislatively respond to the
Court on the issue, leaving even the most recent version of the honest-
services doctrine vulnerable. This jostling between the Supreme Court and
Congress, however, illustrates the delicate balance between the government
branches in defining a federal crime, as well as the balance between the
states and the Federal Government on the issue. As the balance next shifts to
154 See id.; Gopalan, supra note 44, at 460-61 (noting the urge to criminalize
conduct previously "dealt with by other areas of the law"). But see generally Samuel W.
Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1491 (2008) (noting the advantages of
"overbreadth" in criminal law).
1ss As President Barack Obama noted,
No country is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the
economy to enrich themselves or if police can be bought off by drug
traffickers. . . . People everywhere should have the right to start a business
or get an education without paying a bribe. We have a responsibility to
support those who act responsibly and to isolate those who don't, and that
is exactly what America will do.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Ghanian Parliament (July 11,
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaian-parliament.
For this reason, among others, the Department of Justice has increased prosecutions, under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, of corporate bribery of foreign government officials. See
generally Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Bribery Legislation in the United States and
United Kingdom, 75 Mo. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011).
156 For a discussion of these issues in the context of corporate bribery of foreign
government officials, see generally id.
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Congress, legislators may choose to consider the guidance provided by the
Supreme Court's recent trilogy of decisions. All the while, the development
of the honest-services doctrine remains one of the most dynamic, multi-
dimensional issues in the law today.

